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1 Introduction
There have been many bubbles in the real estate market in different economies since the
1980s culminating in the bubble in the US real estate sector which resulted in the global
financial crisis in 2008–2010. The Chinese real estate market has experienced rapid
price rises particularly during the period end 2000 to end 2015 when the national house
price index rose by 332%; with house price rises being driven by the strong growth and
rapid urbanization of the Chinese economy, as well as lack of alternative investment
opportunities. According to Bordo and Jeanne (2002) property booms and busts have
been a fairly frequent occurrence in the global economy topic as compared to stock
market booms and busts.
The issue of the possibility of a real estate bubble in China is an issue of increasing
concern given the rapid price rises of recent years, for example, Zhang and Sun (2006)
highlights the risks to Chinese banks of real estate credit exposure, the possible impact
on local government finances and the dangers to foreign capital flows of large house
price fluctuations. There are many ways in which to measure the existence of property
bubbles, including using price to average income, price to rent and rental yield
compared to the cost of mortgages. In this paper, we take a less direct approach and
we regard the market value of a property as a state output variable changing over time;
we similarly regard the economic factors determining the fundamental real estate price
as changing inputs.
A key advantage of using a state space model is that it is able to process nonsta-
tionary time series while allowing for the addition of variables that cannot be observed.
The variables that cannot be observed are referred to as state variables. A linear state
space model is typically composed of two equations, a state equation and a signal
equation. The state equation can be used to represent the relation between observable
and unobservable variables, while the signal equation describes the trends of unob-
servable variables. In our case, the extent of overvaluations is an unobservable variable
and we therefore use the state space model to avoid the issue of inappropriate model
specification in order to predict the extent of the deviation between market prices and
fundamentals in the Chinese real estate sector.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we review some of the previous
literature on bubbles in the real estate market. Section 3 provides an outline of the state
space model used in our analysis. Section 4 outlines the state space model that we
employ for our empirical analysis. Section 5 estimates demand and supply equations in
order to calculate the unobservable fundamentals real estate prices and estimates the
deviation of market prices from the fundamental. Section 6 attempts to link the
deviation of prices to changes in the most important Chinese national policies and
section 7 concludes.
2 The development of the Chinese real estate market
Up until 1980 China operated a centrally planned housing system but over time a
number of reforms have changed the system to a much more market-oriented housing
sector. Prior to 1980 urban housing in China was basically either owned by work units
of State Owned Enterprises (SEOs) or housing management departments of local
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governments. Residential housing was allocated to SEOs or housing management
departments which in turn rented it to employees at very low rents with the State
retaining the ownership of property. The central government played a significant role in
determining the amount of housing investment and its allocation. The development of a
private market in real estate in China began with reforms that were started in 1980
when the Chinese government implemented a variety of housing market commercial-
ization policies. Those culminated in the 1988 central government document
BImplementation Plan for a Gradual Housing System Reform in Cities and Towns^,
which marked the beginning of a major programme of nationwide housing reform. The
reforms permitted public housing units to be sold to their existing tenants at substan-
tially discounted prices. In addition, there was also a programme to raise the rents
towards more market oriented levels, which had limited success as the new rents were
often still insufficient to cover the maintenance.
A second reform effort started in 1994, when the Chinese central government issued
BThe Decision on Deepening the Urban Housing Reform.^ The reform tried to improve
both the supply and demand sides to create a housing market. On the supply side there
was provision of subsidized housing for low income groups, while high-income groups
were expected to purchase regular market housing. On the demand side, a dual housing
finance system was established using a combination of social savings and private
savings. Further emphasis was given to privatize more of the public housing stock at
more realistic market prices.
The most important set of reforms came with the 1998 notice: BNotification from the
State Council on Further Deepening the Reform of the Urban Housing System and
Accelerating Housing Construction.^ This notice banned SOEs from either building or
buying new housing units for their employees, replacing it with a system of employee
subsidies. It also encouraged the private sector to step into housebuilding and banks to
lend to consumers with the object to create a proper functioning private market for
housing. Over the period 1998–2002 there were a number of measures taken to
stimulate the private housing market in China, including reductions in personal income
tax, sales taxes and mortgage rates set at levels aimed at stimulating housing demand. It
should be noted that revenues from land sales have become and an important source of
local government revenues over this period, accounting for over 30% in Cities such as
Beijing and Zhejiang.
The results of all these reforms means that some 80% of the Chinese housing stock
is in now in private hands. The proportion of housing transactions as a percentage of
GDP has risen from 4.1% in 2002 to 13.3% of GDP in 2016 and house price growth
has averaged 9.4% per annum over this period. During the period 1998 to 2010
outstanding residential mortgage loans have grown 112 times to 4.76 Trillion RMB
($697 billion) and all outstanding real estate-related loans have grown 24 times to 7.33
Trillion RMB. For a fuller discussion of housing policy in China see Li (2016).
3 Literature review
Ultimately house prices are determined simply by the forces of supply and demand and
the price will adjust over time with changes in the factors affecting the demand and
supply. Bourassa et al. (2001) use selected fundamental variables such as real income
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(employment and the real wage rate), real construction costs, and the real after-tax
interest rate as key determinants of supply and demand when looking for house price
bubbles in three major cities in New Zealand. Liang and Cao (2007) and Chen and Zhu
(2008) identify rapid GDP growth, bank lending and the rapid urbanization of China, as
people move from rural locations to the Cities, as key drivers of the demand side in
China. Another important factor on the demand side is economic agents’ expectations
relating to future prices, with expectations of price rises or falls influencing the decision
of whether to buy or sell. Prices can also be influenced by government policies such as
the building of roads, transport links to other cities, schools, hospitals, greenspace and
planning permission. Governments can also heavily influence housing demand through
changes in taxes on income and property and through the amount of land that can be
used for housing stock which affects both the demand and supply and hence the
equilibrium price. Ahuja et al. (2010) note that central government and local
government fiscal relations, land development policies and land prices are key
determinants of the supply of housing in China. According to Lai (2017) using a user
cost approach framework, a combination of high income growth, rapid credit expansion
and low interest rates lies behind the rapid rise in prices in the Chinese housing market
with demand persistently outstripping supply. The basic argument behind the user cost
approach is that Chinese citizens have a choice between saving money at low interest
rates or buying housing stock with a prospective higher rental yield and capital appre-
ciation and this is the main explanation of the imbalance in the Chinese property market.
The monetary policy of central banks and credit conditions can have a large
influence on the real estate market. Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2015) argues that real estate
prices can be explained by global monetary liquidity conditions especially in emerging
markets. In the case of the dramatic Japanese property bubble of 1985–1990 Okina and
Shiratsuka (2004) argue that lax monetary policy by the Bank of Japan was a prime
driver of the housing bubble. While McDonald and Stokes (2013) look at house price
rises in 10 US cities over the period 1987–2010 using the Case-Shiller house price
indices. Using the VAR modelling procedure and Granger causality tests they find that
the reductions of interest rate by the Federal Reserve were a significant cause of the US
housing bubble.
There are various fundamental approaches to valuing real estate, for example,
Leamer (2002) points out that the fundamental price of property should be the present
value of the future rent. Leamer argues that using large deviations of price to rental
ratios from their historical norms can be a useful method of detecting housing bubbles.
In their study, Björklund and Söderberg (1999) look at Swedish house prices over the
period 1985 to 1994. They argue that a fundamental determinant of house prices is the
Gross IncomeMultiplier (GIM). Their study finds that the ratio of house prices to rental
income was too high and conclude that a bubble existed in the Swedish market. Ortalo-
Magne and Rady (2006) use a life-cycle model of the housing market combined with a
property market ladder to show that the income of young households is a prime
determinant of their ability to afford a down-payment on a starter home. They show
that, in such circumstances, changes in income may yield a housing price over-reaction
with the house prices of trade-up homes exhibiting the most volatility. Their model also
finds some empirical support when applied to the UK and US housing markets.
As well as fundamental determinants of house prices there is also the possibility of
speculative activity pushing up the price driven by herding behaviour and irrational
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expectations of future price rises which can lead to a significant deviation of prices
from those justified by fundamental determinants. Caballero (2006) point out that an
additional reason for house price inflation is that that in many countries, especially
developing countries, there is a shortage of investment assets which, in turn, leads to
over speculation in the real estate market and the frequent emergence of bubbles in the
sector. Real estate is often the focus of investors in emerging markets because it
generally has better property rights and legal protections in place for investors.
According to Herring and Wachter (1999) bank behaviour can lead to exaggerated
movements in house prices. In a market with real estate prices rising, banks lend more
loans for property purchases as rises in real estate prices increase the value of bank
capital to the extent that banks own real estate. Banks may then perceive that there is a
lower risk of real estate lending. As such, an increase in real estate prices can increase
the amount of banking loan exposure to the real estate sector which in turn leads to
further rises in real estate prices. Once prices of real estate peak, a fall in the price of
real estate will lower the value of the banking sectors real estate assets and the value of
loans collateralized by real estate. There may also be defaults, which further depletes
banks capital, increasing the perceived riskiness of the real estate sector and in turn
reduces the supply of credit to the real estate industry leading to further falls in prices
and further reductions in loans to the real estate sector. Regulators may intervene to the
weakening of bank capital positions by increasing capital requirements and instituting
stricter rules for classifying and provisioning against real estate assets ultimately
leading to even less activity in the real estate sector and lower prices.
Studies on the Chinese property market have grown in recent years. Liang and Cao
(2007) investigate the relationship between property prices and bank lending for the case
of China over the period 1999–2006, and find that there is unidirectional causality
running from bank lending to property prices. Zhang et al. (2012) show that Chinese
house prices can also be linked to changes in the macroeconomic variables using a non-
linear autoregressive moving average with exogenous inputs approach combined with
the vector error correction model over the period 1999–2010. Their estimations show
that the mortgage rate, money supply growth rate, producer prices and the real exchange
rate are key drivers of Chinese house prices while surprisingly they do not detect a
significant role for personal disposable income, international trade or real incomes. Guo
and Huang (2010) show that hot money from abroad has been a significant driver of the
Chinese stock and property prices. While Liu and Wray (2010) argue that the liquidity
driving the property prices in China is the result of massive intervention in the foreign
exchange market by the Peoples Bank of China as reflected in the large increase in
Chinese foreign exchange reserves. The increase in the Renminbi money supply
resulting from the intervention means artificially low interest rates and high money
supply and credit growth. Dreger and Zhang (2013) argue that that there was a large rise
in the real estate market as a direct result of the fiscal stimulus package unleashed by the
Chinese authorities as a result of the global financial crisis and also the very loose money
market conditions permitted by the Chinese monetary authorities. Using a dataset
covering some 35 major Chinese cities over the period 1998 to 2009, the authors apply
a panel model along with cointegration techniques and find that Chinese real estate was
some 25% higher than the equilibrium value implied by the fundamentals at the end of
2009, with the overpricing especially high in cities in southeast coastal areas and special
economic zones.
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Xu and Chen (2012) also argue that Chinese monetary policy actions are the key
driver of real estate price growth in in China over the period 1998 to 2009. They
examine the impact of monetary policy variables which includes the money supply
growth rate, the long term bank loan rate and a mortgage credit policy indicator to
analyse real estate price growth dynamics in China. Their empirical results show a two
way causal connection, with a lower interest rate, higher money supply growth rate and
a loosening of mortgage down payment requirements leading to rapid price rises for
real estate. This then leads to even more loans to the sector and a further loosening of
credit standards. Du et al. (2011) look at the connection between Chinese land policy
and its impact on the dynamic relationship between the house prices and land prices in
the Chinese real estate market. Using panel data sets for Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and
Chongqing they demonstrate that there exists a long-run equilibrium between Chinese
urban housing and land markets. Wu et al. (2012) show that price to rent ratios have
risen substantially over time in China being over 40 in some cities. They also show that
rises in land prices has been a major force in driving up real estate prices in China with
land prices rising over 800% between 2003 and 2010. This has created bubble like
conditions in certain Chinese cities.
The existence of housing bubble in China has previously been explored by Man Hui
and Yue (2006) who use a macro based econometric model to detect the existence of a
housing bubble in Beijing and Shanghai in 2003. Interestingly while they are not able
to detect the existence of a bubble in Beijing they are able to detect one in Shanghai
which is shown to be approximately 22% overvalued. While Ahuja et al. (2010) find
that as of mid-2010 house prices in China were not significantly overvalued except in
cities such as Shanghai and Shentzhen. Although, they also detect signs of overvalu-
ations in the luxury segment in both Beijing and Nanjing.
In the following section, we use a state space model to examine the existence of a
real estate bubble in China. A deviation of property prices from their market funda-
mentals involves estimating a variable that cannot be observed. To overcome this
problem we choose a state space model. The state space model has been increasingly
used in recent years economic research. See for example Bertus and Stanhouse (2001)
who uses it to test for a bubble in the gold market. Lau et al. (2005) apply it to
investigate the existence of rational stock market bubbles in the Asian economies. Man
Hui and Gu (2009) use a state space model to analyse house prices in Guanzhou and
find that house prices peaked with a 43% overvaluation in October 2007. Han et al.
(2008) also use a state space model to measure the extent of overvaluation of the
property market in Shanghai and show that the market become approximately 22%
overvalued. While Teng et al. (2013) use the state space model to detect and estimate
the size of housing market bubbles in both Hong Kong and Taipei.
4 State space modelling of real estate in China
For our analysis of the Chinese property market, we adopt a State Space Model (SSM),
which is a powerful framework -widely used in physics, engineering and other
sciences- for the analysis of dynamic systems. In many applications, the driving forces
behind the evolution of economic variables are (at least partially) not observable or
measurable. For example, at an individual level a person’s income may depend on their
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intelligence, special abilities, social skills, and so on. Similarly, at an aggregate level,
economic theory suggests that macroeconomic variables such as economic
growth are driven by unobservable factors, e.g. technological change or human
capital accumulation. For this reason, SSMs have been applied in the econo-
metrics literature to model unobserved variables such as; expectations, measure-
ment errors, missing observations, permanent income, unobserved components
(cycles and trends) and the non-accelerating rate of unemployment. Extensive
surveys of applications of state space models in econometrics can be found in
Hamilton (1994a, Chapter 13) and Harvey et al. (2004).
In the presence of both correlated and unobserved variables, adopting SSM
represents an improvement upon standard regression analysis as a SSM can
allow for endogeneity. While linear regression models use exogenous variables
to distinguish the explained variation from the unexplained variation, a SSM
relies on the dynamics of the state variables and the linkage between the
observed variables and state variables to draw statistical inference about the
unobserved states. In this respect, a SSM can represent an improvement also
upon VAR techniques. Comparing SSM to standard VAR models when explan-
atory variables are not observable, standard VAR models can no longer be
applied to study the evolution of the endogenous variables. However, it is easy
to extend the VAR framework to analyse scenarios with unobservable explana-
tory variables by using SSM. In fact, a wide range of time series models,
including the classical linear regression model and ARIMA models, can be
written and estimated as special cases of a state space specification.
In this paper we use a SSM to analyse real estate demand, real estate supply
and the unobservable overvaluation component. Modelling real estate demand
and supply typically suffers from issues of omitted variables and endogenous,
i.e. mutually correlated, variables. The first benefit of using a SSM is to be
able to include non-stationary and endogenous macro-economic variables in the
demand and supply equations. This improves upon a VAR technique, where
only co-integrated variables can be included and a vector error correction model
(VECM) should be imposed. The second benefit of using a SSM is to be able
to estimate the unobserved overvaluation component by estimating a fundamen-
tal price through the Kalman filter, which is the standard estimation technique
in SSM.
SSMs allow the researcher to model an observed (multiple) time series, ytf gTt¼1, as
being explained by a vector of (possibly unobserved) state variables, ξtf gTt¼1, which are
driven by a stochastic process. A basic linear state SSM is formed by two equations.
The first equation, called measurement equation, describes the relation between the
observed time series, yt, and the (possibly unobserved) state ξt:
yt ¼ Aξt þ νt; νt∼N 0;Rð Þ measurement equationð Þ: ð1Þ
In general, it is assumed that the data yt are measured with error, which is reflected in
the measurement error νt that enters the measurement equation. The standard approach
is to model νt as a Gaussian error term normally distributed with zero mean and some
given variance R.
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The second equation, the transition equation, describes the evolution of the (possibly
unobserved) state variables as being driven by the stochastic process of innovations ωt:
ξt ¼ Bξt−1 þ ωt;ωt∼N 0;Qð Þ transition equationð Þ ð2Þ
It is typically assumed that also innovations are normally distributed with zero mean
and a given variance Q. State space models can also be formulated much more
generally than this specification. For example, the system matrices A and B could
depend explicitly on time, or one could introduce policy variables and constants in the
specification. However, our model will be characterized by a simple formulation where
state variables follow a random walk model, i.e. B is an identity matrix.
Generally, in practical applications the system matrices A and B together with the
variances R and Q are unknown and have to be estimated. Whenever the explanatory
variables are not observable Least Squares estimation is not the correct way to go.
However, even in this case, one can apply likelihood based inference, since the Kalman
filter allows to construct the likelihood function associated with a state space model.
The SSM is therefore estimated by maximizing the estimated likelihood function
through a numerical procedure. We apply this procedure by using the Sspace package
in the EViews® software.
Our first step is to obtain consistent estimations of real estate demand and supply
functions for China. To do this, we select a number of macroeconomic variables for
each function. We verify their stationarity properties and co-integration. We opt to only
include co-integrated variables in each function, even if in principle a SSM can handle
variables that are not co-integrated. By doing this, we do not have to impose any
structure on the functions and we can still obtain consistent estimations. In particular,
we model that all macro variables evolve as a random walk, so that no stationarity in
the estimated demand and supply is superimposed by the modelling assumptions.
After finding consistent estimations for demand and supply, we move to the second
step of our analysis. We interpret that estimated demand and supply represent the
fundamental forces beyond price movements and we estimate the unobserved funda-
mental price that would equate demand and supply through a new SSM iteration, by
modelling the unobserved fundamental price as a random walk. As for the other
macroeconomic variables, modelling a random walk process for the fundamental price
is a natural choice because we do not want to impose any structure that could influence
the fundamental price beyond the estimated factors. Finally, we compare the estimated
fundamental price with the observed price, we compute their deviation ratio and
analyse its properties.
Compared to other approaches in the literature reviewed in section 3, the novel
contribution of our methodology is that the deviation ratio measures a purely irrational
bubble component. In other words, our bubble component does not include price
changes that are due to non-equilibrium between supply and demand, where demand
includes not only the users’ market but also investors’ demand. This feature is
important because real estate markets can be characterized by a fundamental mismatch
between supply and demand which can take time to correct and by a component of
demand that is investment driven and that is typically not decreasing in price.1 A fair
1 See for example DiPasquale and Wheaton (1992).
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account of the bubble component should therefore exclude those components.
Moreover, in our analysis we do not consider rents on purpose, because those are co-
determined in the economy with the observable market prices, whereas we want to
have a measure of the fundamental unobservable real estate price that depends as much
as possible on fundamental macro-economic factors.
5 Empirical analysis
The model is estimated by using 44 quarterly observations from 2004Q1 to 2014Q4 for
various time series. The data are obtained from the National Bureau of Statistics of
China. We consider the following variables:
1) SS: National Real Estate Selling Space
2) FS: National Real Estate Completion Space
3) P: Real Estate Sale Price reported in (reported in CNY/square meters)
4) GDP: Gross Domestic Product
5) PDI: Disposable income(reported in CNY/person)
6) MR: Loan Interest Rate (official 3 to 5 years interest rate)
7) CPI: Consumer Price Index
8) M1: Narrow Money Supply
As it is often the case with this type of macro variables, evaluating the data with
Augment Dickey-Fuller test reveals that these variables are non-stationary in levels, but
become stationary in first differences. We also adjust for seasonality with the Eviews
Census X12 method and take the log of all variables to correct for heteroscedasticity.
SS is our measure for real estate demand and FS is our measure for real estate supply.
We carry out Johansen tests to select co-integrated variables for demand and supply.
After that we estimate the two functions by a SSM.
5.1 Demand side
We include five variables in the demand equation: real estate sale space SS, sale price P,
disposable income PDI, interest rate MR and consumer price index CPI. The variables
are chosen on the basis of the Johansen test. Table 1 shows that there are five co-
integrated relationship within the chosen variables of the demand equation. This implies
that their relationship is stable across the sample period, indicating that the demand
equation has economic meaning. The resulting demand equation is the following:
ln SStð Þ ¼ dv1t  ln Ptð Þ þ dv2t  ln PDItð Þ þ dv3t  ln MRtð Þ þ dv4t  ln CPItð Þ þ μt ð3Þ
Since each variable is in time series, they are subscripted with time sign-t before
being transformed into the natural logarithm. The coefficients are also time-varying and
are assumed to be random walk series in the signal equations:
dv1t ¼ dv1t−1 þ ε1t ; dv2t ¼ dv2t−1 þ ε2t ; dv3t ¼ dv3t−1 þ ε3t ; dv4t ¼ dv4t−1 þ ε4t ð4Þ
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The residuals of the above five equations are assumed to have independent and
identical distributions. Equations (3) and (4) form a SSM are estimated by Kalman filter
using the Sspace analysis tools in Eviews7.0®. The estimated coefficients represent the
long term and stable elasticity of sold real estate space with respect to each variables.
Results are reported in Table 2 below.
We notice from Table 2 that the coefficient DV1 is positive and significant, this
implies that demand for real estate increases in price. This apparently unusual
positive relation of prices on demand is not uncommon in markets characterized
by a strong investment, or speculation, motive. We notice that the coefficient DV2
is not significant and is excluded from the demand equation in the following steps
of our analysis. Coefficients DV3 and DV4 are significant and they show a
positive effect of interest rates and a negative effect of inflation. Similarly to what
happens with the coefficient of price, the positive coefficient of interest rates,
apparently a non-standard result, is due to the fact that Chinese national govern-
ment policies have systematically raised interest rates in periods of strong demand
as discussed in section 6. The negative coefficient of inflation is as expected and
due to household budget constraints (Table 3).
5.2 Supply side
We repeat the same procedure in order to estimate the supply function.
We check that five co-integrated relationships exist also in the variables of the
supply equation and we include the five variables in the supply equation: real estate
Table 1 Co-integration test for the demand equation
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Trace Statistic 0.05 Critical Value
None * 0.566740 91.26551 69.81889
At most 1 * 0.372167 56.13594 47.85613
At most 2 * 0.316227 36.58574 29.79707
At most 3 * 0.264359 20.62033 15.49471
At most 4 * 0.168020 7.725774 3.841466
Trace test indicates 5 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level
*denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level
Table 2 Estimation of the parameters in the demand equation
Final State Root MSE z-Statistic Prob.
DV1 2.377801 2.298454 1.034522 0.0034
DV2 −0.154792 0.006288 −7.951273 0.8957
DV3 0.052206 0.053696 0.972257 0.0061
DV4 −0.351807 1.056569 −0.332971 0.0091
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completed real estate space FS, sale price P, money supply M1, interest rate MR and
GDP. The resulting supply equation is the following:
ln FStð Þ ¼ sv1t  ln Ptð Þ þ sv2t  ln M1tð Þ þ sv3t  ln MRtð Þ þ sv4t  ln GDPtð Þ þ ηt ð5Þ
Also the coefficients are assumed to be random walk series with i.i.d. errors in the
signal equations:
sv1t ¼ sv1t−1 þ ξ1t ; sv2t ¼ sv2t−1 þ ξ2t ; sv3t ¼ sv3t−1 þ ξ3t ; sv4t ¼ sv4t−1 þ ξ4t ð6Þ
In this case, eqs. (5) and (6) form a SSM are estimated by Kalman filter using the
Sspace analysis tools in Eviews7.0®. The estimated coefficients represent the long term
and stable elasticity of completed real estate space with respect to each variable. Results
are reported in Table 4 below.
We notice from Table 4 that all coefficients are significant. SV1 is positive
and this implies that demand for real estate increases in price as expected. We
notice that the coefficient SV2 is positive implying that money supply increases
real estate supply. Coefficients SV3 and SV4 show a negative effect of interest
rates and a positive effect of GDP. The positive effect of money supply and the
negative effect of interest rates are due to the fact that national policies have
systematically used money supply and base interest rate to stimulate or alter-
natively curb real estate development activity. The positive effect of GDP on
real estate supply is standard.
Table 3 Co-integration test for the supply equation
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Trace Statistic 0.05 Critical Value
None * 0.839862 128.2216 69.81889
At most 1 * 0.514890 64.11154 47.85613
At most 2 * 0.432954 38.79323 29.79707
At most 3 * 0.285672 18.71895 15.49471
At most 4 * 0.185068 4.20499 3.841466
Trace test indicates 5 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level
*denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level
Table 4 Estimation of the parameters in the supply equation
Final State Root MSE z-Statistic Prob.
SV1 0.284715 0.425151 0.669680 0.0031
SV2 0.060843 0.068098 0.893456 0.0095
SV3 −0.598513 0.629294 −0.951086 0.0086
SV4 0.301307 0.686145 0.439130 0.0046
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5.3 Equilibrium price
We use the results from the previous estimations and estimated demand and
supply from the measurement equations, and we estimate the unobservable
fundamental price (FP).
ln SStð Þ ¼ DV1 ln FPtð Þ þ DV3 ln MRtð Þ þ DV4 ln CPItð Þ þ μt ð7Þ
ln FStð Þ ¼ SV1 ln FPtð Þ þ SV2 ln M1tð Þ þ SV3 ln MRtð Þ þ SV4 ln GDPtð Þ þ ηt ð8Þ
As in the case of the estimation of demand and supply, in order not to super-impose
assumptions, we model that the fundamental price follows a random walk in the signal
equation:
ln FPtð Þ ¼ ln FPt−1ð Þ þ εt ð9Þ
where μt, ηt, εt are i.i.d.
The unknown series ln(FPt) is then estimated as the unknown of the SSM formed by
(7), (8) and (9) by Kalman filter. We interpret the difference between ln(Pt) - ln(FPt) as
it is the portion of price that is not explained by the dynamics of demand and supply,
where the demand and supply have been estimated on the basis of broad macro-
financial factors and not simply imposed to be at equilibrium. By standard results we
obtain that:
ln Ptð Þ−ln FPtð Þ≈ Pt−FPtð Þ=FPt ð10Þ
Equation (10) defines the deviation ratio which is our measure of the irrational (i.e.
bubble) component in the observed real estate price. We plot this ratio in Fig. 1.
As we can notice from Fig. 1, the deviation ratio is generally positive throughout the
sample period and substantial in terms of magnitude. As a robustness check, we also
perform an ADF test on the deviation ratio.
From Table 5, we notice that the deviation ratio is nonstationary in levels but
becomes stable in first differences, therefore indicating that the deviation ratio is a
I(1) series. This confirms that an irrational component exists in the real estate price and
is significant. We also find evidence of a structural break in the deviation ratio at the
end of 2010. After this period, the deviation ratio increases substantially. In the
following section we analyse the dynamics of the deviation ratio over time and we
relate those to policy changes.
6 Policy discussion
There is relatively limited research on Chinese housing policies published in English.
The papers of Li and Chiang (2012) and Li (2016) are notable exceptions and
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extensively review those policies over the last decade. They explain that the Chinese
central government has substantially advocated three types of policies to cool down the
property market and to curb potential housing bubbles over the past decade: restricted
bank loan (xiandai), restricted sale price (xianjia) and restricted housing purchase
(xiangou). Those policies have changed frequently, in an attempt to effectively control
the market with objectives of promoting growth and stability. We can now analyze the
dynamics of the deviation ratio with respect to the policy changes. There are various
interesting features of the deviation ratio that are worth noticing in Fig. 1. First,
we observe that the deviation ratio seems to have a cyclical behaviour over one
calendar year; this behaviour, which is common to many western economies,
can be explained by the fact that more properties tend to come on the market
in the spring-summer period.
Looking at the deviation ratio from 2004 to 2006 shows the effects of some
important policies introduced by the State Council in 2005 aimed at stabilizing property
prices. The introduction of those policies in 2005 marks an important shift from the
previous 2001–2004 period when State Council policies had as primary objective to
sustain and promote the real estate market (see Li 2016). In particular, in a market
Fig. 1 Quarterly Deviation Ratio from end 2003 to end 2014
Table 5 Unit root test for the deviation ratio
ADF test statistic 0.05 critical value 0.10 critical value conclusion
deviation ratio −1.897304 −2.931404 −2.603944 not stable
deviation ratio (first diff.) −4.742939 −2.936942 −2.606857 stable
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dominated by low interest rates, in March 2005 the People’s Bank of China (PBOC)
increased the minimum down payment ratio for homebuyers from 20% to 30%. We
notice that the deviation ratio decreases from 35% in mid-2005 to 5% at the end of
2006, showing that the effect of the price-stabilizing policies while not immediate are
quite powerful.
Next we notice that despite the cyclical behaviour, the deviation ratio in 2007 is
much lower than in the previous years. Li and Chiang (2012) explain that from
March 2007 to August 2008, the PBOC increased the residential loan rates 6 times
and the deposit reserve ratio 13 times. These were extreme measures that the
PBOC had never adopted before. Moreover, the Ministry of Housing and Urban-
Rural Development increased the Housing Provident Fund (HPF) loan rates 6
times in a row. 2 Researchers have commented that those policies may have a
distortive impact and unintended consequences. Moreover, the suppression on the
bubble in the real estate market does not last long as the deviation ratio still
reaches 30% in 2007, signalling that the real estate market is overheated and is
little impacted by the by the monetary policy in short term.
With the financial crisis happening around the world in 2008, the real estate market
in China became suddenly weaker. To avoid an economic recession, a series of new
policies were formulated by the PBOC in October 2010. In particular, from October
27th the central bank decided to adjust the lower bound of the personal loan interest rate
to 0.7 times the benchmark interest rate and revert the down payment portion back to
20%. There were five issuance of Notice on Lowering the RMB Benchmark Interest
Rates for Loans and Deposit Reserve Rate of Financial Institutions. For low-cost
housing, affordable housing and housing rental, policies provided tax free land for
developers according to a defined portion of the total space. This welfare policy aimed
at protecting the rigid demand of inhabitants while the loan interest and the subsidy are
both unfavorable in this period. We notice that the trend of the deviation ratio is
different in 2008 with respect to other years, as it reaches its bottom, rather than a
peak, in the second quarter. In this period, due to the global economic recession,
investors and speculators had less funds and confidence even in China, despite the still
booming property market. Despite the global recession in 2008, the real estate market
in China remains quite stable throughout 2009 mainly due to the effects of the
favourable policies.
We then find evidence of a structural break in the deviation ratio from 2010
onwards. The behaviour is still cyclical but the average ratio from 2010 to 2014 is
35%, whereas it is 15% in the preceding sub-sample. Moreover, the magnitude of
volatility is also higher after 2010. It can therefore be noticed that the real estate market
of China recovers quickly from the recession but after the stimulating policy interven-
tion sale prices rise quickly and significantly shift away from the estimated fundamental
value. For this reason, April 2010 marks the start of a new set of policy measures aimed
at restricting purchases and loans with the objective of limiting real estate appreciation
and to keep the market stable. On 30 April 2010, the State Council issued the restrictive
purchase policy (xiangou) to cool down the overheated property market. Restrictive
2 Chen and Deng (2014) explain that the HPF is self-funded circuit institution separated from the market-based
financial system and it is a compulsory savings scheme to provide self-funded housing, where employers and
employees of the public sector contribute 5% of employees’ monthly incomes to individual HPF accounts.
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purchases set purchase limits on the number of flats that could be sold to households. In
40 major cities, residents with local hukou (i.e., household registration) can buy up to
two flats, nonlocal residents or foreigners can only buy one flat, and the interval for
buying a second flat must be at least 2 years. Moreover, to control construction targets
in an attempt to stabilize the market expectations, the central government required
regional governments to issue property price controls in 2011 and by March 2011 608
cities in China issued policies to control real estate prices according to the Construction
Department Database. Li (2016) comments that after the Chinese government imple-
mented the restrictive purchase policy, none of the cities had any signs of housing
bubbles in 2010/11. However, eight cities had bubbles detected in 2011/12 and most
cities have shown signs of bubbles since 2012. We notice that despite the restrictive
policies from 2011 to 2013, the deviation ratio peaks at 80% at the beginning of 2012
and stays at an average in excess of 40% thereafter.
7 Conclusions
Based on discussion and analysis above, we have employed the SSM as a means to
detect a real estate bubble in the Chinese real estate market. By estimating the real
estate demand and supply with a SSM using a broad number of macroeconomic and
financial factors, we have been able to isolate the non-fundamental price component.
We have then compared the market price to the fundamental price to calculate a
deviation ratio, which is our measure of the extent of the bubble in the Chinese real
estate market. Using the deviation ratio, we have described how the bubble component
changes over time and we attempt to highlight how the deviation responds to changes
in relation to policies of the Chinese authorities.
In line with some of the previous literature, we have found quite strong evidence of a
bubble, especially after 2010, when the deviation ratio has an average value in excess
of 40%. Compared to previous approaches in the literature, the novel contribution of
our methodology is that the deviation ratio measures a purely bubble component. In
other words, our bubble component does not include price changes that are due to non-
equilibrium between supply and demand, where demand includes not only the users’
market but also investors’ demand. This feature is important because real estate markets
are characterized by a fundamental mismatch between supply and demand, due to the
time to develop property, and by a component of demand that is investment driven and
that is typically not decreasing in price and a fair account of the bubble component
should not include those components.
Looking at the dynamics of the deviation ratio with respect to policy changes
broadly shows that stimulating monetary policies (especially post 2008) had strong
positive effects on the bubble component, whereas policies that aimed to limit or
reverse the bubble component had only limited and short lived effects. In line with
Li (2016) we find evidence that interest rate policies or restricted housing purchase
policies in specific cities post 2011 did not limit the bubble component at the aggregate
national level. Given this evidence, we attribute a fundamental role in the inefficacy of
interest rate policies to the role played by shadow banking. As the recent literature
shows that bank lending is increasingly independent from the PBOC, it remains an
open question whether shadow banking lending supports, weakens, or amplifies the
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effects of monetary policy. Gabrieli, Pilbeam and Shi (2018 forthcoming) contribute to
this recent debate by showing that Chinese Shadow Banking works independently from
official monetary policy: it amplifies increases in the money supply but weakens the
effects of restrictive interest rate-based monetary policy decisions. Given that virtually
all of the official interest rate changes in the last decade have been motivated by policy
objectives focussed on the real estate market, we conclude that the inability to curb the
real estate bubble is very much related to the opposing role played by Shadow Banking.
Future research could take a further step and specifically investigate the role of shadow
banking in real estate price dynamics in China.
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